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Abstract—Attack graphs offer a powerful framework for security risk assessment. They provide a compact representation of the attack
paths that an attacker can follow to compromise network resources from the analysis of the network topology and vulnerabilities. The
uncertainty about the attacker’s behaviour makes Bayesian networks suitable to model attack graphs to perform static and dynamic
security risk assessment. Thus, whilst static analysis of attack graphs considers the security posture at rest, dynamic analysis
accounts for evidence of compromise at run-time, helping system administrators to react against potential threats. In this paper, we
introduce a Bayesian attack graph model that allows to estimate the probabilities of an attacker compromising different resources of the
network. We show how exact and approximate inference techniques can be efficiently applied on Bayesian attack graph models with
thousands of nodes.
Index Terms—Attack Graphs, Security Risk Assessment, Bayesian Networks, Approximate Inference.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The efforts to protect networks cannot cope with the sophis-
tication of modern cyber attacks, as shown by the history
of data-breaches that organizations have suffered recently
[1]. Identify and patch vulnerabilities is not always possible,
since lack of manpower or the impossibility of interrupting
critical systems prevents from doing so. Thus, assessing
and prioritizing the risks of the network is essential to
optimize resources and the effort required to protect the
network. However analysing the network risks in isolation
offers a limited perspective of the network security, given
the complex interdependencies between vulnerabilities. In
this sense, Attack Graphs (AGs) [2], [3] provide a powerful
framework to represent prior knowledge about vulnera-
bilities and network connectivity, depicting the paths of
an attacker through the system by exploiting successive
vulnerabilities.
AGs allow system administrators to reason about threats
and risks in a formal way to better select countermeasures
[4]. Two types of analysis can be performed: Static analysis
determines the a priori risks of the network when we con-
sider the security posture at rest. Dynamic analysis updates
those risks in light of any indication of compromise at some
of the networks components, e.g. from Security Information
and Event Management (SIEM) and Intrusion Detection
Systems (IDS). While the static analysis of AGs is useful
for network hardening, the dynamic analysis allows system
administrators to profile the attacker’s paths and prioritize
remediation strategies to mitigate the effects of ongoing
attacks.
Given the uncertainty about the attackers’ ability to
exploit vulnerabilities, Bayesian Networks (BNs) provide an
adequate framework to model AGs [5]–[9], since they depict
causal relationships between random variables in a compact
way. However, computing the unconditional and posterior
probabilities that are needed to perform static and dynamic
analysis on AGs is an NP-Hard problem. Therefore, the use
of efficient inference techniques is of essence to reduce the
time and computational resources required and improve the
applicability of the approach to perform both static and
dynamic analysis of Bayesian Attack Graphs (BAGs).
On the other side, given the typical clustered structure
of corporate networks, the BAGs that are expected in real
scenarios should also reflect this cluster structure. In this pa-
per we show that this kind of cluster structures favours the
scalability of exact and approximate inference algorithms to
perform static and dynamic analysis of BAGs, scaling up
to graphs with thousands of nodes [8], [9]. This modular
structure of the networks and the BAGs can also facilitate
analyses at different levels of granularity, which can allow
a better scalability for Bayesian inference algorithms and, at
the same time, produce risk assessments that can be more
interpretable to system administrators, especially for large
corporate networks.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In
Sect. 2 we describe BAG models and exact and approximate
inference techniques to compute the probabilities needed for
the static and dynamic analysis. In Sect. 3 we show experi-
mental results comparing exact and approximate inference
techniques for the static and dynamic analysis of synthetic
BAGs of different sizes. Finally, in Sect. 4 we discuss the
future research directions that, in our opinion, should be
considered, to provide more efficient and scalable security
risk assessment with AGs.
22 BAYESIAN ATTACK GRAPHS
AGs are graphical models that represent the knowledge
about networks vulnerabilities and their interactions, show-
ing the different paths an attacker can follow to compromise
a given objective by exploiting a set of vulnerabilities. Along
each attack path, vulnerabilities are exploited in sequence,
so after each successful exploit the attacker acquires more
privileges towards her goal. In the literature we can distin-
guish two main types of representations: state-based [10], [11]
and logical [3], [12] AGs.
In line with most of the recent literature on AGs, in
this paper, we only consider logical AGs, since state-based
representations are known to scale exponentially with the
number of nodes and vulnerabilities in the network, making
them impractical even for small corporate networks. In
contrast, logical AGs produce more compact representations
that grow polinomially with the number of vulnerabilities
and the number of connected pairs of hosts [13]. Logical
AGs rely on the monotonicity principle: the attacker never
relinquishes privileges once obtained. Although not always
applicable, this assumption is reasonable in most cases, as
discussed in [3].
Some of the literature on AG analysis assumes that
monotonicity induces a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG)
structure [5], [7]. Although this is not completely true, and
some directed cycles may be present, monotonicity helps to
get rid of many directed cycles related to duplicate attack
paths. However, [14] explain how to handle and eliminate
remaining directed cycles without loss of integrity. For the
remainder of the paper, we will consider AGs with a DAG
structure.
The uncertainty about the attacker’s behaviour and the
DAG structure of the AG make Bayesian networks (BNs) a
reasonable alternative to model and analyse AGs. Thus, BNs
allow to calculate the probability of an attacker reaching a
security condition (state) in the AG. More formally, a BN
can be definedd as a directed acyclic graphical model where
the nodes represent random variables and the directed
edges represent the dependencies between these random
variables. Let X = {X1, ..., Xn} be a set of (continuous or
discrete) random variables. The joint probability distribu-
tion can be written as:
p(X) =
n∏
i=1
p(Xi|pai) (1)
Then, under the BN representation, for each node Xi there
is a directed edge from each node in pai, the set of parents
nodes of Xi, pointing to Xi. In the particular context of the
BAG, the nodes represent the different security states that
an attacker can acquire. We model the behaviour of these
states as Bernoulli random variables.
2.1 Conditional Probability Tables
The information available at each node in the BAG is
the conditional probability distribution p(Xi|pai), i.e. the
probability of a node to be compromised given the state of
its parent nodes pai. In oder words, p(Xi|pai) represent
the probabilities of an attacker reaching a security state
Xi given the observation of its preconditions pai and the
vulnerabilities vi that can be exploited to compromise Xi.
The probabilities of an attacker successfully exploiting
vulnerabilities are parameters of the BAG model that are
used to calculate the conditional probability tables. A com-
mon approach to estimate pvi , the probability of an attacker
successfully exploiting a vulnerability vi, is by means of
CVSS [15], as proposed in [6]–[9]. More concretely the
exploitability submetric of CVSS can be considered more
appropriate to estimate these probabilities since it tries to
measure the difficulty of exploiting a vulnerability.
To main types of conditional probability tables can be
consider: AND and OR. In the first case all preconditions
must be satisfied to be able to compromise node Xi. In
contrast, in the OR case, only one precondition is needed
to attempt to attack node Xi. Thus, the AND conditional
probability table can be calculated as:
p(Xi|pai) =
{
pli , ∃Xj ∈ pai|Xj = F
1− (1 − pli) (1 −
∏
j:Xj
pvj ), otherwise
(2)
whereas for OR conditional probability we have:
p(Xi|pai) =
{
pli , ∀Xj ∈ pai|Xj = F
1− (1 − pli)
∏
j:Xj
(1− pvj ), otherwise
(3)
The leak factor pli models the non-perfect behaviour of
the alert system and the possible presence of unknown
zero-day vulnerabilities. By combining (2) and (3) we can
extend the construction of conditional probability tables to
intermediate cases, where different subsets of preconditions
need to be satisfied before trying to compromise Xi.
2.2 Non-perfect Alert System and Zero-day Vulnerabili-
ties
The leak factor pli in (2) and (3) models the cases where,
even when all the preconditions are in the False state, i.e.
not achieved by the attacker, there is still some non-zero
probability of Xi taking the True state. The reason for this is
because the attacker can successfully exploit a zero-day vul-
nerability to compromiseXi or because the alert correlation
system has triggered a false alarm.
Defining the error probability of the alert system as pe,
and the probabilities of an attacker successfully exploiting a
zero-day vulnerability for a node in the BAG as pzi , the leak
factor can be computed as:
pli = 1− (1− pe)(1− pzi) (4)
Estimating pe, the error probability of the alert correlation
system, is far from a trivial task. Although some ad hoc
methodologies have been applied in the literature [16], [17],
it still remains an open problem. The difficulty relies on the
dynamic aspects of the system behaviour. However, even
a rough estimate of pe can be useful to provide better risk
assessments with BAGs.
Estimating pzi , the probability of an attacker successfully
exploiting a zero-day vulnerability to compromise node
Xi is even more challenging. First, we need to estimate
the probability of having zero-day vulnerabilities for the
software running in each machine of the network. Second, it
is not trivial to estimate the easiness of exploitation of these
potential vulnerabilities. Finally, the preconditions needed
3for the attacker to exploit a zero-day vulnerability can be the
postconditions of longer attack paths. Thus, the severity of
the potential zero-day vulnerabilities should be assessed ac-
cording to the proximity of the current node with respect to
the target node. As discussed in [9], similar to the estimation
of the probability of successful exploitation of vulnerabilities
with CVSS scores, in the case of zero-day vulnerabilities
we can estimate the corresponding probabilities by means
of the Common Weaknesses Scoring System (CWSS) [18].
Thus, CWSS scores provide a quantitative measure measure
of the unfixed weaknesses present in a software application.
2.3 Static and Dynamic Analysis
For the static analysis of the BAGs, we are interested in
calculating the unconditional probabilities p(Xi) for all the
nodes in the graph. Thus, p(Xi) corresponds to the proba-
bility of an attacker reaching a given security condition Xi.
Using Bayes rule we can compute this probability as:
p(Xi) =
∑
X−Xi
p(X) =
∑
X−Xi
n∏
j=1
p(Xj|paj) (5)
where X − Xi indicates that we sum over all the set of
random variables X except Xi. These probabilities can be
used as risk estimates to harden the network or to apply
static risk mitigation techniques.
For the dynamic analysis of the BAG, given evidence of
attack on a set of nodes Xe (by means of the alert correla-
tion system), we need to compute the posterior probability
p(Xi|Xe) in all the nodes of the network, except for the
set Xe. Applying Bayes rule we can compute the posterior
probability as:
p(Xi|Xe) =
p(Xi,Xe)
p(Xe)
=
∑
X−{Xi,Xe}
p(X)∑
X−Xe
p(X)
(6)
The posterior probabilities provide a re-estimation of the
risk at run-time, which can help system administrators to
plan and prioritize security measures to mitigate or contain
an ongoing attack [7].
The exact calculation of (5) and (6) is an NP-Hard
problem [19]. Thus, efficient algorithms such as Variable
Elimination [20] or Junction Tree (JT) [21] are necessary even
for small graphs. However, the applicability of these tech-
niques can be limited in cases where the graphs are dense,
demanding a lot of computational resources to compute (5)
and (6). Even when the structure of BAGs is expected to
have some special properties, given the typical clustered
network structure and the limited number of attack paths to
compromise a node, there are no guarantees about the com-
putational complexity for these exact inference techniques.
An experimental comparison between Variable Elimination
and JT is presented in [8], showing that JT outperforms Vari-
able Elimination both in terms of memory and time needed
to compute the unconditional and posterior probabilities.
Thus, JT can be applied to perform both static and dynamic
analysis to graphs up to a few thousands of nodes.
Approximate inference in BNs is also known to be NP-
Hard [19], but efficient techniques like Loopy Belief Prop-
agation (LBP) [22] allow to efficiently estimate (5) and (6).
Since for BAGs we only have Bernoulli random variables,
LBP scales in time and memory as O(N2s), where N is
the number of nodes in the BAG, and s is the scope of the
biggest factor, i.e. the maximum number of parent nodes
that a node can have in the graph. Since we expect to
have some security in-place we expect s to be small. Then,
as shown in [9], LBP allows to scale-up to larger BAGs
compared to exact inference techniques. Despite LBP do not
provide the exact values for the unconditional and posterior
probabilities, we should not be deterred about the estimates
produced by LBP, since the probabilities of exploitation of
vulnerabilities, modelled through CVSS scores, are already
a rough estimate and, on the other hand, as shown in
[9], the accuracy of LBP to estimate (5) and (6) is more
than reasonable to help system administrators to harden
the networks or to propose countermeasures to mitigate the
effect of ongoing attacks.
3 EXPERIMENTS
In this section we present an experimental evaluation com-
paring the time performance of LBP and JT for the static and
dynamic analysis of BAGs, i.e. the time required to compute
the unconditional and posterior probabilities respectively.
We have used the Bayes Net toolbox for Matlab1 as the core
implementation for all the algorithms.
Following a similar methodology than in [8], [9] we have
generated synthetic AGs for the experiments. Unfortunately,
currently, there are no collections of AGs of similar variety
obtained empirically from real systems. To the best of our
knowledge no collections of empirically obtained AGs exist
in the public domain at all. Then, to provide a comprehen-
sive evaluation of the algorithms with AGs of different sizes
and interdependencies we need to resort to synthetic AGs.
Since typical corporate networks are structure into sub-
networks and contain several hosts with common software
installations, we can expect some form of cluster structure
in the corresponding AG. Moreover, we expect a reduced
number of vulnerabilities allowing the attacker to escalate
privileges across different subnetworks, as routing and fire-
wall rules between subnetworks usually hinder the progres-
sion of the attack. This is in line with the AG examples
shown in [23], where only attacks across subnetworks are
considered. To generate the synthetic graphs we have con-
sidered networks with clusters (subnetworks) of the same
size nc. For each cluster we have generated pseudo-random
graphs with a DAG structure where we limit the maximum
number of possible parents to each node to m. Finally, the
dependencies across clusters are modelled by adding one
edge from one node in each cluster to one node in each of
the other clusters, provided that the DAG structure required
for BNs is preserved.
For the experiments we have generated synthetic graphs
with nc = 20 and 50, m = 3, varying the total number of
nodes from 100 to 1, 000. The values of the probabilities
of successful exploitation of vulnerabilities are drawn at
random from the distribution of CVSS scores in [24]. For
each graph size explored, we have generated 20 indepen-
dent graphs for each value of nc considered.
1. https://github.com/bayesnet/bnt
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Fig. 1. Time to compute the unconditional probabilities for LBP and the
JT algorithm for cluster networks with different cluster sizes (nc = 20
and 50) and m = 3 for the static analysis of the BAGs.
In Fig. 1 we show the average time2 required to compute
the unconditional probabilities for the static analysis of the
BAGs. We observe that JT scales exponentially with the
number of nodes, whereas LBP3 scales linearly and requires
less time to perform the analysis. The size of the clusters
does not have an impact in the time performance of LBP
and, in the case of JT, the difference between the two cases
is moderate.
In Fig. 2 we report the time required to perform the
dynamic analysis, when we observe evidence of attack in
3 nodes (chosen at random). In Fig. 2(a) we can observe that
both JT and LBP scale linearly with the number of nodes
and that the cluster size, nc, has a very small impact on
the performance. However, in contrast to the static analysis,
JT is much faster than LBP, computing all the posterior
probabilities in less than 1 second for BAGs with 1, 000
nodes, as can be appreciated with more detail in Fig. 2(b).
The experimental results suggest that JT is more appeal-
ing to perform dynamic security risk assessmentwith BAGs.
However, the exponential scalability for the static analysis,
which in the case of JT is required before performing dy-
namic analysis, limits its applicability to large networks. In
contrast, LBP scales linearly for both the static and dynamic
analysis of the graph. Despite LBP is slower than JT for the
dynamic analysis, as shown in [9], LBP allows to monitor
the values of the posterior probabilities at each iteration
of the algorithm. Therefore, we can also obtain accurate
estimates for the posterior probabilities before the algorithm
converges.
4 DISCUSSION
Attack Graphs are a powerful tool for static and dynamic
risk assessment of networks, since they take into account
the interdependencies between vulnerabilities depicting the
ways an attacker can compromise different network re-
sources. Bayesian networks allow to measure the risk at the
different nodes of the AG given the likelihood of successful
exploitation of the vulnerabilities present in the networks
and the relation between the preconditions needed to com-
promise a node. Although computing the probabilities in
2. The experiments have been conducted in a 16 GB computer with
an Intel Core i7 processor at 3.40 GHz.
3. We have used the parallel version of LBP [19].
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Fig. 2. Time to compute the posterior probabilities for LBP, and the JT
algorithm for cluster networks with different cluster sizes (nc = 20 and
50) and m = 3 for the dynamic analysis of the BAGs (when we observe
evidence of attack at 3 random nodes): (a) Time in natural scale; (b)
Time in logarithmic scale.
BNs is an NP-Hard problem, we have shown that the use of
appropriate inference techniques such as Junction Tree and
Loopy Belief Propagation, can allow to use BAGs for static
and dynamic risk assessment, helping system administra-
tors to enforce the security of the networks and mitigate the
effect of ongoing attacks.
However, the heterogeneity of modern infrastructures
and the dynamic aspect of the networks limits the appli-
cation of traditional attack graph generation tools for these
environments. Then, new methodologies and models are
needed to cope with the requirements of modern networks.
In the remainder of this section, we discuss some of the
limitations and opportunities for the development of new
attack graph models for both generation and analysis of
AGs.
Although logical representations of AGs [3], [12] scale in
a polynomial way with the number of nodes and vulner-
abilities in the networks, their applicability is still limited
to large scale scenarios, with thousands or millions of de-
vices. Even if they can be computed, in these cases they
offer a limited usability for system administrators. Thus,
new mechanisms are needed to generate more scalable and
interpretable AG models. This can be achieved by clus-
tering security domains that are very similar. For example,
within subnetworks, often we can find many machines that
are configured similarly, so the vulnerabilities present on
those machines should also be similar. Thus, in terms of
5privilege escalation, compromising one or several of this
machines can be considered equivalent.4 On the other hand,
the concept of “security domain” used in traditional AG
methodologies is often restricted to the security privileges
that the attacker can acquire on a single machine. This can
be restrictive for modelling modern networks. For instance,
if the attacker compromise a user account (for example with
a phishing attack), she can have access to several machines
or devices in the system.
Traditional AGs are built by considering only the net-
work topology, reachability, and software vulnerabilities
[12], not considering other security aspects present in the
attack surface of modern infrastructures, such as IoT envi-
ronments. In these scenarios we should also consider the
physical and human vulnerabilities of the system. Thus,
there is a need of new AG generation models capable of
describing this extended and complex attack surface consid-
ering the interdependence between the cyber, human, and
physical aspects of the network security.
Given the complexity and size of modern networks,
different security perspectives can be considered. Thus, high
level abstractions of the AG can help to produce more
interpretable representations, as proposed in [25] to manage
AG complexity for visualization. Similar approaches can be
adopted for AG analysis: Thus, we can allow for tractable
analysis of AGs in very large networks through lower
resolution representations. This induces a trade-off between
accuracy, the level of resolution, and the tractability of the
analysis. For example, in large corporate networks, systems
administrators may prioritize the contention of attacks to
prevent their propagation at subnetwork level. Then, once
the attack is contained within a subset of subnetworks, finer
analyses may be required to mitigate the effect of the attacks
at machine level in the affected subnetworks. To achieve
this, we need to develop mechanisms to produce aggregate
risk estimates at different levels, capable of summarizing
the state of a given subnetwork or a set of machines.
Then, Bayesian inference techniques can also be applied
to perform static and dynamic analysis in such aggregate
models.
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